Search frictions in the labor market help explain the equity premium in the financial market. We embed the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search framework into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with recursive preferences. The model produces a sizeable equity premium of 5.50% per annum with a low interest rate volatility of 1.34%. The equity premium is strongly countercyclical, and forecastable with labor market tightness, a pattern we confirm in the data. Intriguingly, search frictions, combined with a small labor surplus and large job flows, give rise endogenously to rare disaster risksà la Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) . JEL Classification: E21, E24, E40, G12
Introduction
Modern asset pricing research has been successful in specifying preferences and cash flow dynamics to explain the equity premium, its volatility, and its cyclical variation in endowment economies (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999) ; Bansal and Yaron (2004) ; Barro (2006) ). Explaining the equity premium in production economies with endogenous cash flows has proven more challenging.
The prior literature has mostly treated cash flows as dividends. However, in the data labor income accounts for about two thirds, while dividends account for only a small fraction of aggregate disposable income. As such, an equilibrium asset pricing model should take the labor market seriously.
We study aggregate asset prices by incorporating search frictions in the labor market (e.g., Diamond (1982) ; Mortensen (1982) ; Pissarides (1985 Pissarides ( , 2000 ) into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium economy with recursive preferences. A representative household pools incomes from its employed and unemployed workers, and decides on optimal consumption and asset allocation. The unemployed workers search for job vacancies posted by a representative firm. The rate at which a job vacancy is filled is affected by the congestion in the labor market. The degree of congestion is measured by labor market tightness, defined as the ratio of the number of job vacancies over the number of unemployed workers. Deviating from Walrasian equilibrium, search frictions create rents to be divided between the firm and the employed workers through the wage rate, which is in turn determined by the outcome of a generalized Nash bargaining process.
We find that search frictions are important for explaining the equity premium. With reasonable parameter values, the search economy gives rise to an equity premium of 5.50% and an interest rate volatility of 1.34% per annum. The equity premium is strongly countercyclical in the model: the vacancy-unemployment ratio forecasts stock market excess returns with a negative slope, a pattern that we confirm in the data. The model also produces an average stock market volatility of 11.13%.
However, the average interest rate is 3.09%, which is high relative to 0.59% in the data. Finally, the model is broadly consistent with business cycle moments of the labor market.
Intriguingly, the search economy shows rare but deep disasters. In the stationary distribution from the model's simulations, the unemployment rate is positively skewed with a long right tail.
The mean unemployment rate is 9.32%. The 2.5 percentile is nearby, 6.33%, but the 97.5 percentile is far away, 20.47%. Accordingly, output and consumption are both negatively skewed with a long left tail, giving rise to disaster risks as in Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) . Applying Barro and Ursúa's (2008) peak-to-trough measurement on the simulated data, we find that the consumption and GDP disasters in the model have the same average magnitude, about 20%, as in the data.
The consumption disaster probability is 3.22% in the model, which is close to 3.63% in the data.
However, the GDP disaster probability is 4.99%, which is high relative to 3.69% in the data.
We show via comparative statics that three key ingredients of the search economy, when combined, are capable of producing disasters and a high equity premium. First, we calibrate the value of unemployment activities to be (relatively) high, implying a small labor surplus (output minus wages). Intuitively, a high value of unemployment activities implies that wages are less elastic to labor productivity. By dampening the procyclical covariation of wages, the small labor surplus magnifies the procyclical covariation (risk) of dividends, increasing the equity premium. Also, the quantitative impact of the inelastic wages is especially important in recessions, when the labor surplus is even smaller (because of lower productivity). This mechanism amplifies the risk and risk premium, making the equity premium and the stock market volatility strongly countercyclical.
Second, job flows are large in the model. The U.S. labor market is characterized by large job flows in and out of employment. For instance, whereas the rate of capital depreciation is around 12% per annum, the job destruction rate can be as high as 60% in the data (e.g., Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006) ). As such, contrary to swings in investment that have little impact on a disproportionately large capital stock, cyclical variations in job flows cause large fluctuations in aggregate employment. Third, the cost of vacancy posting is high relative to the small labor surplus.
When a large negative shock hits the economy, the labor surplus becomes even smaller. The high vacancy cost then suppresses the incentives of hiring, stifling job creation flows, even though jobs continue to be destroyed at a high rate. Accordingly, aggregate employment falls off a cliff, giving rise to economic disasters. In contrast, such disasters are absent in baseline production economies.
Our work contributes to the disaster risks literature. Rietz (1988) argues that rare disasters help explain the equity premium puzzle. Barro (2006 Barro ( , 2009 , Barro and Ursúa (2008) , and Barro and Jin (2011) examine long-term international data that include many disasters (see also Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) ). Gourio (2010) embeds disasters exogenously into a production economy, and argues that disaster risks help explain the equity premium. 1 Gabaix (2011) argues that time-varying severity of disasters helps explain a variety of asset pricing puzzles. We show that search frictions give rise to disaster risks endogenously in production economies. The insight that disaster risks can arise naturally in theory lends credence to the disaster risks explanation of the equity premium. We also advance this literature by starting to inquire about the origin and internal mechanism of disasters.
The model's success in explaining the equity premium quantitatively is surprising. In prior asset pricing studies in production economies, often with capital as the only input, the amount of endogenous risk is too small, giving rise to a negligible equity premium. Rouwenhorst (1995) shows that baseline production economies fail to explain the equity premium because of consumption smoothing. With internal habit preferences, Jermann (1998) and Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) use capital adjustment costs and cross-sector immobility, respectively, to restrict consumption smoothing to explain the equity premium. However, both models struggle with excessively high interest rate volatilities. Using recursive preferences to curb interest rate volatility, Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) show that a production economy with capital adjustment costs still fails to reproduce a high equity premium (see also Campanale, Castro, and Clementi (2010) ). We show that search frictions seem to overcome many difficulties encountered in baseline production economies. Danthine and Donaldson (2002) and Favilukis and Lin (2011) show that staggered wage con-1 Gourio (2010) defines dividends as levered output and treats the claim to the levered output as equity. The return on capital, which is the stock return in production economies, still has a low risk premium and a small volatility. Our search economy goes one step further by producing a high and time-varying equity premium via endogenous disaster risks, while defining dividends as the net residual payout to shareholders.
tracting is important for asset prices. Instead of sticky wages, we use the standard search framework with period-by-period Nash bargaining to break the link between wages and marginal product of labor. Merz and Yashiv (2007) and Bazdresch, Belo, and Lin (2009) show that labor adjustment costs help explain stock market valuation and the cross section of expected returns, respectively.
We differ by examining aggregate asset prices in an equilibrium search economy.
Our work is also built on the recent labor search literature. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) incorporate search frictions into the real business cycle framework. Shimer (2005) argues that the unemployment volatility in the search model is low relative to that in the data. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Gertler and Trigari (2009) use small labor surplus and staggered wage contracting, respectively, to address the Shimer puzzle. We instead study equilibrium asset prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the model. Section 3 describes the model's solution. Section 4 discusses quantitative results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We embed the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search model into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium economy with recursive preferences.
Search and Matching
The model is populated by a representative household and a representative firm that uses labor as the single productive input. Following Merz (1995), we use the representative family construct, which implies perfect consumption insurance. In particular, the household has a continuum (of mass one) of members who are, at any point in time, either employed or unemployed. The fractions of employed and unemployed workers are representative of the population at large. The household pools the income of all the members together before choosing per capita consumption and asset holdings.
The representative firm posts a number of job vacancies, V t , to attract unemployed workers, U t , at the unit cost of κ. Vacancies are filled via a constant returns to scale matching function, G(U t , V t ). We specify the matching function as:
in which ι > 0 is a constant parameter. This matching function, originated from Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) , has the desirable property that matching probabilities fall between zero and one.
Specifically, define θ t ≡ V t /U t as the vacancy-unemployment (V /U ) ratio. The probability for an unemployed worker to find a job per unit of time (the job finding rate), f (θ t ), is:
and the probability for a vacancy to be filled per unit of time (the vacancy filling rate), q(θ t ), is:
It follows that f (θ t ) = θ t q(θ t ) and ∂q(θ t )/∂θ t < 0, meaning that an increase in the relative scarcity of unemployed workers relative to job vacancies makes it more difficult for a firm to fill a vacancy.
As such, θ t is a measure of labor market tightness from the perspective of the firm.
Once matched, jobs are destroyed at a constant rate of s per period: employment, N t , evolves as:
Because the size of the population is normalized to be unity, U t = 1 − N t . As such, N t and U t can also be interpreted as the rates of employment and unemployment, respectively.
The Representative Firm
The firm takes aggregate labor productivity, X t , as given. The law of motion of x t ≡ log(X t ) is:
in which 0 < ρ < 1 is the persistence, σ > 0 is the conditional volatility, and ǫ t+1 is an independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) standard normal shock.
The firm uses labor to produce with a constant returns to scale production technology,
in which Y t is output. The dividends to the firm's shareholders are given by:
in which W t is the wage rate (to be determined later in Section 2.4).
Let M t+△t be the representative household's stochastic discount factor from period t to t + △t.
Taking the matching probability, q(θ t ), and the wage rate, W t , as given, the firm posts an optimal number of job vacancies to maximize the cum-dividend market value of equity, denoted S t :
subject to the employment accumulation equation (4) and a nonnegativity constraint on vacancies:
Because q(θ t ) > 0, this constraint is equivalent to q(θ t )V t ≥ 0. As such, the only source of job destruction in the model is the exogenous separation of employed workers from the firm.
Let µ t denote the Lagrange multiplier on the employment accumulation equation (4), and λ t the multiplier on the nonnegativity constraint q(θ t )V t ≥ 0. The first-order conditions with respect to V t and N t+1 in maximizing the equity value of equity are given by, respectively:
Combining the two first-order conditions yields the intertemporal job creation condition:
The optimal vacancy policy also satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
Intuitively, equation (10) says that the marginal cost of vacancy posting, κ/q(θ t ) − λ t , equals the marginal value of employment, µ t . In particular, κ/q(θ t ) − λ t is the marginal cost of vacancy posting, taking into account the matching probability and the nonnegativity constraint. When the firm posts vacancies, with V t > 0 and λ t = 0, equation (10) says that the unit cost of vacancy posting, κ, is equal to µ t , conditional on the probability of a successful match, q(θ t ). On the other hand, when the nonnegativity constraint is binding, with V t = 0 and λ t > 0, θ t = V t /U t = 0. Equation (3) also implies that q(θ t ) = (1 + θ ι t ) −1/ι = 1. As such, equation (10) reduces to µ t = κ − λ t .
The intertemporal job creation condition (12) is intuitive. The marginal cost of vacancy posting at period t should equal the marginal value of employment, µ t , which in turn equals the marginal benefit of vacancy posting at period t+1, discounted to period t with the stochastic discount factor, M t+1 . The marginal benefit at period t + 1 includes the marginal product of labor, X t+1 , net of the wage rate, W t+1 , as well as the marginal value of employment, µ t+1 , which in turn equals the marginal cost of vacancy posting at t + 1, net of separation.
Define the stock return as R t+1 = S t+1 /(S t − D t ) (recall S t is the cum-dividend equity value).
The constant returns to scale assumption implies that (see Appendix A for derivations):
As such, the stock return is the ratio of the marginal benefit of vacancy posting at period t + 1 over the marginal cost of vacancy posting at period t.
The Representative Household
The representative household maximizes utility, denoted J t , over consumption using recursive preferences (e.g., Epstein and Zin (1989) ). The household can buy risky shares issued by the representative firm as well as a risk-free bond. Let C t denote consumption and χ t denote the fraction of the household's wealth invested in the risky shares. The recursive utility function is given by:
in which β is time discount factor, ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and γ is relative risk aversion. This utility separates ψ from γ, helping the model to produce a high equity premium and a low interest rate volatility simultaneously.
Tradeable assets consist of risky shares and a risk-free bond. Let R f t+1 denote the risk-free interest rate, which is known at the beginning of period t. Let Π t denote the household's financial wealth, and let R Π t+1 = χ t R t+1 + (1 − χ t )R f t+1 be the return on wealth. Also, let b denote the value of unemployment activities, T t the taxes raised by the government to pay for the unemployment benefits in lump-sum rebates. The household's budget constraint is given by:
In particular, the household's dividends income, D t , is included in the current financial wealth, Π t .
Finally, the government balances its budget, meaning that T t = U t b.
The household's first order condition with respect to the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset, χ t , gives rise to the fundamental equation of asset pricing:
In particular, the stochastic discount factor, M t+1 , is given by:
Finally, the risk-free rate is given by
Wage Determination
The wage rate is determined endogenously by applying the sharing rule per the outcome of a generalized Nash bargaining process between the employed workers and the firm. Let 0 < η < 1 be the workers' relative bargaining weight. The wage rate is given by (see Appendix B for derivations):
The wage rate is increasing in labor productivity, X t , and in labor market tightness, θ t . Intuitively, the more productive the workers are, and the fewer unemployed workers seeking jobs relative to the number of vacancies, the higher the wage rate will be for the employed workers. Also, the value of unemployment activities, b, and the workers' bargaining weight, η, affect the elasticity of wage with respect to productivity. The lower η is, and the higher b is, the more the wage will be tied with the constant unemployment value, inducing a lower wage elasticity to productivity.
Competitive Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the financial markets clear. The risk-free asset is in zero net supply, and the household holds all the shares of the representative firm, χ t = 1. As such, the equilibrium return on wealth equals the stock return, R Π t+1 = R t+1 , and the household's financial wealth equals the cum-dividend equity value of the firm, Π t = S t . Because the government balances its budget, the household's budget constraint (17) reduces to Π t+1 /R Π t+1 = Π t − C t + W t N t . The financial markets equilibrium then implies S t+1 /R t+1 = S t − C t + W t N t . As such, D t = W t N t − C t , which, combined with equation (7), provides the goods market clearing condition:
3 Calibration, Computation, and the Model's Solution
We calibrate the model in Section 3.1, discuss our nonlinear solution methods in Section 3.2, and describe the basic properties of the model's solution in Section 3.3.
Calibration
We calibrate the model in monthly frequency. Krause and Lubik (2007) . This target pins down the monthly job separation rate, s. In particular, the steady state labor market flows condition, s(1 −Ū ) =fŪ , sets s = 0.05. This value of s, which is also used in Andolfatto (1996) , is close to the estimate of 0.053 from Clark (1990) , and is within the range of estimates from Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006) .
The calibration of the value of unemployment activities, b, is somewhat controversial in the labor search literature. Shimer (2005) pins down b = 0.4 by assuming that the only benefit for an unemployed worker is the government unemployment insurance. Gertler and Trigari (2009) also adopt such a conservative value for b, while exploring alternative wage specifications that allow more stickiness in adjusting to labor productivity than the equilibrium wage from the generalized Nash bargaining process. However, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) argue that in a perfect competitive labor market, b should equal the value of employment. In particular, the value of unemployment activities measures not only unemployment insurance, but also the total value of leisure, home production, and self-employment. The long-run average marginal product of labor in the model is unity, to which b should be close. We set b to be 0.85, which is not as extreme as 0.955 in Hagedorn and Manovskii. Also, we set the workers' bargaining weight, η, to be 0.052 as in Hagedorn and
Manovskii. With all the other parameters calibrated, we pin down the vacancy cost parameter, κ = 0.975, so that the average unemployment rate in the simulated economy is roughly 10%.
Computation
Although analytically transparent, solving the model numerically is challenging. There are several reasons. First, the search economy is not Pareto optimal because the competitive equilibrium does not correspond to the social planner's solution. The firm in the decentralized economy does not take into account the congestion effect of posting a new vacancy on the labor market when maximizing the equity value, whereas the social planner does so when maximizing social welfare. As such, we must solve for the competitive equilibrium directly. Second, because of the occasionally binding constraint (9), standard perturbation methods cannot be used. As such, we solve for the competitive equilibrium using a nonlinear projection algorithm, while applying the Christiano and
Fisher (2000) idea of parameterized expectations to handle the nonnegativity constraint.
Third, because of the nonlinearity in the model and our focus on nonlinearity-sensitive asset pricing moments, we must solve the model on a large number of grid points to ensure accuracy. Also, we apply the idea of homotopy to visit the parameter space in which the model exhibits strong nonlinearity. Because of the nonlinearity in many economically interesting parameterizations, we can only update the parameter values very slowly to ensure the convergence of the solution algorithm.
The state space of the model consists of employment and productivity, (N t , x t ). The goal is to solve for the optimal vacancy function:
and an indirect utility function: J ⋆ t = J(N t , x t ) from two functional equations:
. (23) V (N t , x t ) and λ(N t , x t ) must also satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: V t ≥ 0, λ t ≥ 0, and λ t V t = 0.
The standard projection method would approximate V (N t , x t ) and λ(N t , x t ) to solve equations (22) and (23), while obeying the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Christiano and Fisher (2000) argue that, with the occasionally binding constraint, this approach is tricky and cumbersome. As such, we adapt their method of parameterized expectations by approximating the right-hand side of equation (12):
We then exploit a convenient mapping from the conditional expectation function to policy and multiplier functions, thereby eliminating the need to parameterize the multiplier function separately.
In particular, after obtaining the parameterized E t , we first calculate:
Ifq(θ t ) < 1, the nonnegativity constraint is not binding, we set λ t = 0 and q(θ t ) =q(θ t ). We then solve θ t = q −1 (κ/E t ), in which q −1 (·) is the inverse function of q(·) defined in equation (3), and V t = θ t (1 − N t ). Ifq(θ t ) ≥ 1, the nonnegativity constraint is binding, we set V t = 0, θ t = 0, q(θ t ) = 1, and λ t = κ − E t . This approach is convenient because it enforces the Kuhn-Tucker conditions automatically, without the need of parameterizing the multiplier function. (Appendix C contains additional details of our numerical implementation.)
Basic Properties of the Model's Solution
Panel A of Figure 1 plots the ratio of optimal vacancies to unemployment against total employment and labor productivity. We see that labor market tightness is increasing in both states. The labor market is tighter when there are fewer unemployed workers searching for jobs (employment is high), and when the demand for workers is high (productivity is high). More generally, increases in productivity lead the firm to post more vacancies to create more jobs. The rise in employment and wages, and therefore household income, increases aggregate consumption.
From Panel B, we see that the multiplier of the occasionally binding constraint on vacancy, λ t , is countercyclical: λ t equals zero for most values of productivity, but turns positive as productivity approaches its lowest level. The multiplier is also convex in employment: λ t is flat across most values of employment, but rises with an increasing speed as it approaches the lowest level. Intuitively, when the constraint is binding, V t = 0, θ t = 0, q(θ t ) = 1, and λ t = κ− E t , in which E t is the expectation in equation (24). As the economy approaches the low-employment-low-productivity states, E t drops rapidly. This nonlinearity is a natural result of the stochastic discount factor, M t+1 . As consumption approaches zero, marginal utility blows up, causing E t to fall and λ t to rise precipitously.
Quantitative Results
We present basic business cycle and asset pricing moments in Section 4.1 and labor market moments in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we examine the linkage between the labor market and the financial market by using labor market tightness to forecast stock market excess returns. In Section 4.4, we quantify the model's endogenous rare disaster risks that are important for asset prices. We study the model's implications for long run risks and uncertainty shocks in Section 4.5, and cyclical dividend dynamics in Section 4.6. Finally, Section 4.7 reports several comparative static experiments.
Basic Business Cycle and Financial Moments
Panel A of Table 2 reports the standard deviation and autocorrelations of log consumption growth and log output growth, as well as unconditional financial moments in the data. Consumption is annual real personal consumption expenditures, and output is annual real gross domestic product from 1929 to 2010 from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) at Bureau of Economic Analysis. The annual consumption growth in the data has a volatility of 3.04%, and a first-order autocorrelation of 0.38. The autocorrelation drops to 0.08 at the two-year horizon, and turns negative, −0.21, at the three-year horizon. The annual output growth has a volatility of 4.93% and a high first-order autocorrelation of 0.54. The autocorrelation drops to 0.18 at the two-year horizon, and turns negative afterward: −0.18 at the three-year horizon and −0.23 at the five-year horizon.
We obtain monthly series of the value-weighted market returns including all NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq stocks, one-month Treasury bill rates, and inflation rates (the rates of change in Consumer Price Index) from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The sample is from January 1926 to December 2010 (1,020 months). The mean of real interest rates (one-month Treasury bill rates minus inflation rates) is 0.59% per annum, and the annualized volatility is 1.87%.
The equity premium (the average of the value-weighted market returns in excess of one-month Treasury bill rates) in the 1926-2010 sample is 7.45% per annum. Because we do not model financial leverage, we adjust the equity premium in the data for leverage before matching with the equity premium from the model. Frank and Goyal (2008) report that the aggregate market leverage ratio of U.S. corporations is stable around 0.32. As such, we calculate the leverage-adjusted equity premium as (1 − 0.32) × 7.45% = 5.07% per annum. The annualized volatility of the market returns in excess of inflation rates is 18.95%. Adjusting for leverage (taking the leverage-weighted average In Panel A, consumption is annual real personal consumption expenditures (series PCECCA), and output is annual real gross domestic product (series GDPCA) from 1929 to 2010 (82 annual observations) from NIPA (Table 1.1.6) at Bureau of Economic Analysis. σ C is the volatility of log consumption growth, and σ Y is the volatility of log output growth. Both volatilities are in percent. ρ C (τ ) and ρ Y (τ ), for τ = 1, 2, 3, and 5, are the τ -th order autocorrelations of log consumption growth and log output growth, respectively. We obtain monthly series from January 1926 to December 2010 (1,020 monthly observations) for the value-weighted market index returns including dividends, one-month Treasury bill rates, and the rates of change in Consumer Price Index (inflation rates) from CRSP. E[R − R f ] is the average (in annualized percent) of the value-weighted market returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rates, adjusted for the long-term market leverage rate of 0.32 reported by Frank and Goyal (2008) . (The leverage-adjusted average E[R − R f ] is the unadjusted average times 0.68.) E[R f ] and σ R f are the mean and volatility, both of which are in annualized percent, of real interest rates, defined as the one-month Treasury bill rates in excess of the inflation rates. σ R is the volatility (in annualized percent) of the leverage-weighted average of the value-weighted market returns in excess of the inflation rates and the real interest rates. In Panel B, we simulate 1,000 artificial samples, each of which has 1,020 monthly observations, from the model in Section 2. In each artificial sample, we calculate the mean market excess return, E[R − R f ], the volatility of the market return, σ R , as well as the mean, E[R f ], and volatility, σ R f , of the real interest rate. All these moments are in annualized percent. We time-aggregate the first 984 monthly observations of consumption and output into 82 annual observations in each sample, and calculate the annual volatilities and autocorrelations of log consumption growth and log output growth. We report the mean and the 5 and 95 percentiles across the 1,000 simulations. The p-values are the percentages with which a given model moment is larger than its data moment. Table 2 reports the model moments. From the initial condition of zero for log productivity, x t , and 0.90 for employment, N t , we first simulate the economy for 6,000 monthly periods to reach its stationary distribution. We then repeatedly simulate 1,000 artificial samples, each with 1,020 months. On each artificial sample, we calculate the annualized monthly averages of the equity premium and the real interest rate, as well as the annualized monthly volatilities of the market returns and the real interest rate. We also take the first 984 monthly observations of consumption and output, and time-aggregate them into 82 annual observations. (We add up 12 monthly observations within a given year, and treat the sum as the year's annual observation.) For each data moment, we report the average as well as the 5 and 95 percentiles across the 1,000 simulations. The p-values are the frequencies with which a given model moment is larger than its data counterpart.
The model predicts a consumption growth volatility of 3.61% per annum, which is somewhat higher than 3.04% in the data. However, this data moment lies within the 90% confidence interval of the model's bootstrapped distribution with a bootstrapped p-value of 0.46. The model also implies a positive first-order autocorrelation of 0.18 for consumption growth, which is lower than 0.38 in the data. At longer horizons, consumption growth in the model are all negatively autocorrelated.
Most autocorrelations in the data are within 90% confidence interval of the model.
The output growth volatility implied by the model is 4.16% per annum, which is somewhat lower than 4.93% in the data. The model implies a positive first-order autocorrelation of 0.18 for the output growth, which is lower than 0.54 in the data. The model also implies a negative secondorder autocorrelation of −0.14, but this autocorrelation is 0.18 in the data. Both correlations in the data are outside the 90% confidence interval of the model's bootstrapped distribution. However, at longer horizons, the autocorrelations are negative in the model, consistent with the data.
The model performs well in matching financial moments. The equity premium in the model is 5.50% per annum, which is somewhat higher than the leverage-adjusted equity premium of 5.07% in the data. In particular, this data moment lies within the 90% confidence interval of the model's bootstrapped distribution with a p-value of 0.84. The volatility of the stock market return in the model is 11.13% per annum, which is close to the leverage-adjusted market volatility of 12.94%
in the data. The volatility of the interest rate in the model is 1.34%, close to 1.87% in the data. However, the model implies an average interest rate of 3.09% per annum, which is high relative to 0.59% in the data. Overall, the model's fit seems like progress in the equilibrium asset pricing literature with production (see the references discussed in Section 1).
Labor Market Moments
To evaluate the model's fit for labor market moments, we first document these moments per Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008, Table 3 ) using an updated sample (see also Shimer (2005) In Panel A, seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment (U , thousands of persons 16 years of age and older) is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The seasonally adjusted help wanted advertising index, V , is from the Conference Board. The series are monthly from January 1951 to June 2006 (666 months). Both U and V are converted to 222 quarterly averages of monthly series. The average labor productivity, X, is seasonally adjusted real average output per person in the nonfarm business sector from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. All variables are in HP-filtered proportional deviations from the mean with a smoothing parameter of 1,600. In Panel B, we simulate 1,000 artificial samples, each of which has 666 monthly observations. We take the quarterly averages of monthly U, V , and X to convert to 222 quarterly observations. We implement the exactly same empirical procedures as in Panel A on these quarterly series, and report the cross-simulation averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) for all the model moments. To evaluate the model's fit with the labor market moments, we simulate 1,000 artificial samples, each with 666 months. We take the quarterly averages of the monthly unemployment, U , vacancy, V , and labor productivity, X, to obtain 222 quarterly observations for each series. We then apply the exactly same procedures as in Panel A of Table 3 on the artificial data, and report the cross-simulation averages (as well as standard deviations) for the model moments.
Panel B reports the model's quantitative performance. The standard deviations of U and V in the model are 0.15 and 0.10, respectively, which are close to those in the data. The model implies 
, in which H is the forecast horizon in months. The regressors are two-month lagged values of the V /U ratio. We report the ordinary least squares estimate of the slopes (Slope), the Newey-West corrected t-statistics (t N W ), and the adjusted R 2 s in percent. The seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment (U , thousands of persons 16 years of age and older) is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the seasonally adjusted help wanted advertising index (V ) is from the Conference Board. The sample is from January 1951 to June 2006 (666 monthly observations). We multiply the V /U series by 50 so that its average is close to that in the model. In Panel B, we simulate 1,000 artificial samples, each of which has 666 monthly observations. On each artificial sample, we implement the exactly same empirical procedures as in Panel A, and report the cross-simulation averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) for all the model moments. a standard deviation of 0.16 for the V /U ratio, which is lower than 0.26 in the data. The model also generates a Beveridge curve with a negative U -V correlation of −0.56, but its magnitude is lower than −0.91 in the data. The correlation between the V /U ratio and labor productivity is 0.99, which is higher than 0.30 in the data. 4
The Linkage between the Labor Market and the Financial Market
A large literature in financial economics shows that the equity risk premium is time-varying (and countercyclical) in the data (e.g., Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) ). In the labor market, as vacancies are procyclical and unemployment is countercyclical, the V /U ratio is strongly procyclical (e.g., Shimer (2005) ). As such, the V /U ratio should forecast stock market excess returns with a negative slope at business cycle frequencies. Panel A of Table 4 documents such predictability in the data.
Specifically, we perform monthly long-horizon regressions of log excess returns on the CRSP value-weighted market returns,
, in which H = 1, 3, 6, 12, 24, and 36 is the forecast horizon in months. When H > 1, we use overlapping monthly observations of H-period holding returns. The regressors are two-month lagged values of the V /U ratio. The BLS takes less than one week to release monthly employment and unemployment data, and the Conference Board takes about one month to release monthly help wanted advertising index data. 5 We impose the two-month lag between the V /U ratio and market excess returns to guard against look-ahead bias in predictive regressions. To make the regression slopes comparable to those in the model, we also scale up the V /U series in the data by a factor of 50 to make its average close to that in the model. This scaling is necessary because the vacancy and unemployment series in the data have different units.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the V /U ratio forecasts stock market excess returns at business cycle frequencies. At the one-month horizon, the slope is −1.43, which is more than 2.5 standard errors from zero. The standard error is adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations of 12 lags per Newey and West (1987) . The slopes are significant at the three-month and six-month horizons but turn insignificant afterward. The adjusted R 2 s peak at 3.78% at the six-month horizon, and decline to 3.67% at the one-year horizon and further to 1.41% at the three-year horizon.
To see how the model can explain this predictability, we plot in Figure 2 the equity premium in annual percent on the employment-productivity state space. We observe that the risk premium is strongly countercyclical: it is low in good times when both employment and productivity are high, but high in bad times when both employment and productivity are low. From Panel A of Figure 1 , the V /U ratio is strongly procyclical: it is low in bad times (the high-unemploymentlow-productivity states), but high in good times (the low-unemployment-high-productivity states).
The joint cyclical properties of the equity premium and the V /U ratio imply that the ratio should forecast stock market excess returns with a negative slope in the model. Table 4 reports the model's quantitative fit for the predictive regressions. Consistent with the data, the model predicts that the V /U ratio forecasts market excess returns with a negative slope. In particular, at the one-month horizon, the predictive slope is −0.78 (t = −2.19).
At the six-month horizon, the slope is −4.48 (t = −2.39). However, the predictive power of the V /U ratio is stronger in the model than that in the data: both the t-statistic of the slope and the adjusted R 2 increase monotonically with the forecast horizon in the model. In contrast, both moments peak at the six-month horizon but decline afterward in the data.
Panel A of Figure 3 plots the cross-correlations and their two standard-error bounds between the V /U ratio, V t /U t , and future market excess returns, R t+H − R f t+H , for H = 1, 2, . . . , 36 months in the data. No overlapping observations are used. The panel shows that the correlations are significantly negative for forecast horizons up to six months, consistent with the predictive regressions in Table 4 . Panel B reports the cross-correlations and their two cross-simulation standard-deviation bounds from the model's bootstrapped distribution. Consistent with the data, the model predicts significantly negative cross-correlations between V t /U t and future stock market excess returns at short horizons. However, although the cross-correlations are insignificant at long horizons, the correlations decay more slowly than those in the data, consistent with Panel B of Table 4. We report the cross-correlations (in red) between labor market tightness, V t /U t , and future market excess returns, R t+H − R f t+H , in which H = 1, 2, . . . , 36 is the forecast horizon in months, as well as their two standard-error bounds (in blue broken lines). In Panel A, V t is the seasonally adjusted help wanted advertising index from the Conference Board, and U t is the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment (thousands of persons 16 years of age and older) from the BLS. The sample is from January 1951 to June 2006. The market excess returns are the CRSP value-weighted market returns in excess of one-month Treasury bill rates. In Panel B, we simulate 1,000 artificial samples, each with 666 monthly observations. On each artificial sample, we calculate the cross-correlations between V t /U t and R t+H − R f t+H , and plot the cross-simulation averaged correlations (in red) and their two cross-simulation standard-deviation bounds (in blue broken lines). 
Endogenous Rare Disasters
The search economy gives rise endogenously to rare disaster risksà la Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) . We simulate 1,006,000 monthly periods from the model, discard the first 6,000 periods, and treat the remaining one million months as the model's stationary distribution. Figure 4 reports the empirical cumulative distribution functions for unemployment, output, consumption, and dividends. From Panel A, unemployment is positively skewed with a long right tail. As the population moments, the mean unemployment rate is 9.32%, the median is 8.04%, and the skewness is 7.15.
The 2.5 percentile of unemployment is close to the median, 6.33%, whereas the 97.5 percentile is far away, 20.47%. As a mirror image, the employment rate is negatively skewed with a long left tail.
As a result, output, consumption, and dividends all show infrequent but deep disasters (Panels B, The disasters in macroeconomic quantities reflect in asset prices as rare upward spikes in the eq- Figure 5 , its stationary distribution is positively skewed with a long right tail. The conditional equity premium has a mean of 6.12% per annum and a median of 5.67%. The 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles are 2.04% and 11.28%, respectively. However, with small probabilities, the conditional equity premium can reach close to 25% in simulations.
Do the economic disasters arising endogenously from the model resemble those in the data? Barro and Ursúa (2008) apply a peak-to-trough method on international data from 1870 to 2006 to The equity premium Probability identify economic crises, defined as cumulative fractional declines in per capita consumption or GDP of at least 10%. Suppose there are two states, normalcy and disaster. The disaster probability measures the likelihood with which the economy shifts from normalcy to disaster in a given year. The number of disaster years is defined as the number of years in the interval between peak and trough for each disaster event. The number of normalcy years is the total number of years in the sample minus the number of disaster years. The disaster probability is the ratio of the number of disasters over the number of normalcy years. Barro and Ursúa estimate the disaster probability to be 3.63%, the average size 22%, and the average duration 3.6 years for consumption disasters. For GDP disasters, the disaster probability is 3.69%, the average size 21%, and the average duration 3.5 years.
To quantify the magnitude of the disasters in the model, we first simulate the economy for 6,000 monthly periods to reach the stationary distribution. We then repeatedly simulate 1,000 artificial samples, each with 1,644 months (137 years). The sample size matches the average sample size in Barro and Ursúa (2008) . On each artificial sample, we time-aggregate the monthly observations of consumption and output into annual observations. We apply Barro and Ursúa's measurement on each artificial sample, and report the cross-simulation averages and the 5 and 95 percentiles for the disaster probability, size, and duration for both consumption and GDP (output) disasters. The data moments are from Barro and Ursúa (2008) . The model moments are from 1,000 simulations, each with 1,644 monthly observations. We time-aggregate these monthly observations of consumption and output into 137 annual observations. On each artificial sample, we apply Barro and Ursúa's peak-to-trough method to identify economic crises, defined as cumulative fractional declines in per capita consumption or GDP of at least 10%. We report the mean and the 5 and 95 percentiles across the 1,000 simulations. The p-values are the percentages with which a given model moment is higher than its data moment. The disaster probabilities and average size are all in percent, and the average duration is in terms of years. ter probability and the average disaster size in the model are close to those in the data, but the average duration is somewhat higher in the model. In particular, the probability and the average size are 3.22% and 20.44% in the model, which are close to 3.63% and 22% in the data, respectively. The average duration is 4.82 years, which is longer than 3.6 years in the data. However, the cross-simulation standard deviation of the average duration is 1.27 years, meaning that the data duration is within one standard deviation from the model's estimate.
From Panel B of Table 5 , the average size of GDP disasters in the model, 19.47%, is close to that in the data, 21%. However, the disaster probability of 4.99% is higher than 3.69% in the data.
The cross-simulation standard deviation of the GDP disaster probability is 2.16%, meaning that the probability in the data is within one standard deviation from the model's estimate. In addition, the average duration of the GDP disasters in the model is 4.47 years, which is longer than 3.5 years in the data. The cross-simulation standard deviation of the duration is 0.90 years, meaning that the duration in the data is slightly more than one standard deviation from the model's estimate. Number of disasters Duration (years from peak to trough) Figure 6 reports the frequency distributions of consumption and GDP disasters by size and duration averaged across 1,000 economies (each with 137 years) simulated from the model. We observe that the size and duration distributions for consumption and GDP disasters in the model display roughly similar patterns as those in the data (see Barro and Ursúa's (2008) Figures 1 and   2 ). In particular, the size distributions seem to follow a power-law density per Barro and Jin (2011) .
Endogenous Long Run Risks and Endogenous Uncertainty Risks
In this subsection, we explore the model's implications for long run risks and uncertainty shocks. Bansal and Yaron (2004) propose long-run consumption risks as a mechanism for explaining aggre-gate asset prices. Bansal and Yaron specify the following exogenous consumption growth process:
in which g t+1 is the consumption growth, z t is the expected consumption growth, σ t is the conditional volatility of g t+1 , and e t+1 , u t+1 , η t+1 , and w t+1 , are i.i.d. standard normal shocks, which are mutually uncorrelated. Bansal and Yaron argue that the stochastic slow-moving component, z t , of the consumption growth is crucial for explaining the level of the equity premium, and that the mean-reverting stochastic volatility helps explain the time-variation in the risk premium.
Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) argue that long-run risks can arise endogenously via consumption smoothing. Within a production economy with capital as the only productive input, Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (Table 6) show that (monthly) consumption growth follows:
with transitory productivity shocks. With permanent productivity shocks, the z t process follows:
However, their economies fail to generate heteroscedasticity in shocks to expected and realized consumption growth (see their footnote 15). Also, the permanent shocks model produces an equity premium very close to zero. Although the transitory shocks model offers a high equity premium, its calibration includes a time discount factor that is larger than unity.
We investigate how consumption dynamics in our search economy compare with those in the Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) economy and with those calibrated in Bansal and Yaron (2004) . This question is important because different parameterizations of the consumption process specified in equations (26)- (28) can be consistent with observable moments of consumption growth such as volatility and autocorrelations (see Table 2 ). Yet, different parameterizations can imply very different economic mechanisms for the equity premium and its dynamics.
We simulate the search economy for 6,000 monthly periods to reach the stationary distribution, and then simulate one million monthly periods. We calculate the expected consumption growth and the conditional volatility of the realized consumption growth on the employment-productivity state space, and use the solutions to simulate these moments. Fitting the consumption growth process specified by Bansal and Yaron (2004) on the simulated data, we obtain:
In addition, the unconditional correlation between e t+1 and η t+1 is 0.291, that between e t+1 and w t+1 is close to zero, and the correlation between η t+1 and w t+1 is 0.200.
Although the consumption growth is not i.i.d. in our economy, the persistence in the expected consumption growth is only 0.711, which is substantially lower than those in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010) . However, the expected consumption growth is more volatile in our economy. The conditional volatility of the expected consumption growth is 59.1% of the conditional volatility of the realized consumption growth. This percentage is higher than 9.3% and 24.7% in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer as well as 4.4% in Bansal and Yaron. For the stochastic variance, its persistence is 0.889 in our economy, which is lower than 0.987 in Bansal and Yaron. However, the volatility of our stochastic variance is more than seven times of theirs.
We interpret these results as saying that disaster risks play a more important role than longrun risks (in the sense of high persistence of the expected consumption growth) in our economy. To further characterize the endogenous uncertainty shocks in our economy, we plot the conditional market volatility, σ R t , on the employment-productivity state space. From Panel A of Figure 7 , the stock market volatility is strongly countercyclical: it is low in good times and high in bad times.
Panel B reports the empirical cumulative distribution of the stock market volatility in simulations.
We simulate 1,006,000 monthly periods, discard the first 6,000 periods, and treat the remaining one million periods as from the stationary distribution. We see that the conditional volatility hovers around its median about 10% per annum. However, with small probabilities, the market volatility can jump to more than 30%. The endogenous time-varying uncertainty is another dimension of the search economy that is distinctive from the baseline production economy in Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010). As noted, without the powerful propagation mechanism from the labor market, the Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer economy fails to generate time-varying volatilities. Rouwenhorst (1995) shows that dividends are countercyclical in the standard production economies.
Dividend Dynamics
Intuitively, dividends roughly equal profits minus investment, and profits roughly equal output minus wages. Without labor market frictions, the wage rate equals the marginal product of labor, meaning that profits are proportional to, and as procyclical as output. Because investment is more procylical than output and profits, dividends, as profits minus investment, must be countercyclical.
The dividend countercyclicality in the baseline production economies is counterfactual. Dividends in the model correspond to net payout (dividends plus stock repurchases minus new equity issues) in the data. Following Jermann and Quadrini (2010), we measure the net payout using aggregate data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board. 6 The sample is quarterly from the fourth quarter of 1951 to the fourth quarter of 2010. We obtain quarterly real GDP (NIPA Table 1 .1.6) and quarterly implicit price deflator for GDP (NIPA Table 1 .1.9) used to deflate net payout. We detrend real net payout and real GDP as HP-filtered proportional deviations from the mean with a smoothing parameter of 1,600. We do not take logs because the net payout can be negative in the data. Consistent with Jermann and Quadrini, we find that the cyclical components of real net payout and real GDP have a positive correlation of 0.55.
The search economy avoids the pitfall of counterfactual dividend dynamics in the baseline production economies. Intuitively, the wage rate from the generalized Nash bargaining process is no longer equal to the marginal product of labor. Because the value of unemployment activities, b, is positive, wages are less procyclical than productivity. As such, profits are more procyclical than output. In effect, the relatively inelastic wage rate works as operating leverage to magnify the procyclicality (and volatility) of profits. This amplified procyclicality of profits is sufficient to overcome the procyclicality of total vacancy costs, κV t , to turn dividend dynamics procyclical.
6 Specifically, we calculate the net payout as net dividends of nonfarm, nonfinancial business ( Quantitatively, the model succeeds in replicating the dividend procyclicality. We first simulate the economy for 6,000 monthly periods to reach the stationary distribution, and then repeatedly simulate 1,000 artificial samples, each with 711 months (237 quarters). The sample size matches the quarterly series from the fourth quarter of 1951 to the fourth quarter of 2010 in Jermann and Quadrini (2010) . On each artificial sample, we time-aggregate monthly observations of dividends and output into quarterly observations. After detrending the quarterly series as HP-filtered proportional deviations from the mean, we calculate the correlation between the cyclical components of dividends and output. We find that this correlation to be 0.50 in the model, with a cross-simulation standard deviation of 0.14, thereby replicating the correlation of 0.55 in the data.
We also compare the wage dynamics in the model to those in the data. Following Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), we measure wages as labor share times labor productivity from BLS. The sample is quarterly from the first quarter of 1947 to the four quarter of 2010 (256 quarters). We take logs and HP-detrend the series with a smoothing parameter of 1,600. We find that the wage elasticity to labor productivity is 0.46, close to Hagedorn and Manovskii's estimate, meaning that a one percentage point increase in labor productivity delivers a 0.46 percentage increase in real wages. In addition, we measure (quarterly) output as real GDP (NIPA Table 1 .1.6). We find that the correlation between the log wage growth and the log output growth is 0.48, and that the ratio of the wage growth volatility over the output growth volatility is 0.70. To see the model's performance, we first simulate the economy for 6,000 monthly periods to reach the stationary distribution, and then repeatedly simulate 1,000 artificial samples, each with 768 months (256 quarters). On each artificial sample, we take quarterly averages of monthly wages and labor productivity to obtain quarterly series. Implementing the same empirical procedure used on the real data, we find that the wage elasticity to productivity is 0.56 in the model, which is not far from 0.46 in the data. However, the correlation between the log wage growth and the log output growth in the model is 0.89, which is high relative to 0.48 in the data. In the mean time, the relative volatility of the wage growth is 0.36, which is low relative to 0.70 in the data.
Comparative Statics
To shed further light on the economic mechanisms underlying the risk premium in the model, Table   6 conducts three comparative statics by varying the key parameters: (i) the value of unemployment activities, b, changed from 0.85 in the benchmark calibration to 0.4; (ii) the job separation rate, s, from 0.05 to 0.035; and (iii) the vacancy cost, κ, from 0.975 to 0.8. In each experiment, except for the parameter being perturbed, all the other parameters are the same as in the benchmark calibration.
The Value of Unemployment Activities
In the first experiment, the value of unemployment activities, b = 0.4, is set to be the parameter value in Shimer (2005) . Because unemployment is less valuable to workers, the unemployment rate drops to 5.17%. A lower b also means that the wage rate is more sensitive to shocks. As such, the wage elasticity to productivity increases to 0.69 from 0.56 in the benchmark economy. As a result of the higher wage elasticity to productivity, profits and vacancies are less sensitive to shocks.
Employment and output are also less sensitive, giving rise to a lower consumption growth volatility of 1.70% per annum and a lower output growth volatility of 2.05% (Panel A of Table 6 ).
The low-b economy shows essentially no disaster risks. From the stationary distributions in Figure 8, the unemployment rate hovers slightly above 5%. Neither output nor consumption has a long left tail in its empirical cumulative distribution. Using Barro and Ursúa's (2008) peak-to-trough measurement, we find that the disaster probabilities are no greater than 0.7%, and the average size of the disasters are less than 13.5%. Because of the lack of disaster risks, the equity premium drops to only 0.12%, and is largely time-invariant: the V /U ratio shows no predictive power for market excess returns. The stock market volatility also drops to 3.78%.
Consistent with Shimer (2005) , the standard deviation of the V /U ratio in the low-b model is only 2.6%, which is an order of magnitude smaller than 25.5% in the data. As such, a high value of unemployment activities helps alleviate the Shimer puzzle and the equity premium puzzle simultaneously. Intuitively, by dampening the procyclical covariation of wages with productivity, We report three experiments: (i) b = .4 is for the value of unemployment activities set to 0.4; (ii) s = .035 is for the job separation rate set to 0.035; and (iii) κ = .8 is for the vacancy cost set to 0.8. In each case, all the other parameters are identical to those in the benchmark calibration. See Table 2 for the description of Panel A. See Table 3 for the description of Panel B: σ U , σ V , and σ V /U denote the standard deviations of unemployment, vacancy, and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, respectively. ρ U,V is the correlation between unemployment and vacancy. See the caption of Table 4 for the description of Panel C: (1) and (12) denote for forecast horizons of one and 12 months, respectively. See the caption of Table 5 for the description of Panel D: (C) and (Y ) denote consumption and GDP disasters, respectively. ρ D,Y is the correlation between the cyclical components of quarterly dividends and output, and e W,X is the wage elasticity to productivity. The equity premium Probability a high value of b magnifies the procyclical variation of profits and vacancies, so as to increase the volatility of the V /U ratio. At the same time, the high value of b also amplifies the procyclical variation of dividends, so as to raise the equity premium and the stock market volatility.
The Job Separation Rate
In the second experiment, we reduce the job separation rate, s, from 0.05 to 0.035. Because the productive input in the economy is destructed at a lower rate, the disasters in the low-s economy are less extreme and less frequent than those in the benchmark economy. The consumption and GDP disaster probabilities are 1.16% and 2.03%, respectively, which are substantially lower than those in the benchmark economy. The average magnitudes of consumption and GDP disasters are also lower: 14.34% and 14.92%, respectively. The low-s economy also has a lower consumption growth volatility than the benchmark economy: 2.10% versus 3.61% per annum. Because of the lower consumption volatility and the dampened disaster risks, the equity risk premium is close to zero (and largely time-invariant) in the low-s economy.
The Vacancy Cost
In the third experiment, we reduce the vacancy cost parameter, κ, from 0.975 in the benchmark economy to 0.8. The lower vacancy cost means that the firm is more capable of smoothing the impact of exogenous productivity shocks by varying vacancies. As such, the output growth volatility falls to 3.46% per annum, and the consumption growth volatility to 2.85%. More important, the firm is free to create more jobs in bad times to counteract large job destruction flows. As a result, both consumption and GDP disaster probabilities are lower than those in the benchmark economy:
1.74% and 3.22%, respectively. The equity premium falls to 1.93% per annum.
Conclusion
We study aggregate asset pricing by embedding the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search model of the labor market into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium economy with recursive preferences. We find that search frictions in the labor market help explain the equity premium in the financial market. With reasonable parameter values, the model reproduces a sizeable equity risk premium with a low interest rate volatility. The equity premium is also strongly countercyclical, and is forecastable by labor market tightness, a prediction that we confirm in the data. Intriguingly, search frictions create endogenously rare disaster risks as emphasized by Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) .
As a first stab in embedding search frictions into an equilibrium asset pricing framework, we have tried to keep the model parsimonious. The rich dynamics displayed even in this model, many of which are conducive to explaining the equity premium, yet are entirely absent from the base-line production economies, suggest that search frictions in the labor market might be essential for understanding equilibrium asset prices. Several directions are possible for future work. First, one can introduce endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation into our model to develop a unified equilibrium model for both asset prices and business cycles. Second, one can introduce endogenous job destruction along the lines of Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) . Endogenous job destruction can provide an additional amplification mechanism to preserve the model's disaster risks in the presence of capital accumulation. Finally, one can also introduce financial frictions such as defaultable debt into the model to study the interaction between search frictions and financial frictions in explaining economic disasters endogenously.
A The Stock Return Equation
We prove equation (15) following an analogous proof in Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009) in the context of the q-theory of investment. Rewrite the equity value maximization problem as:
in which µ t is the Lagrange multiplier on the employment accumulation equation, and λ t is the Lagrange multiplier on the occasionally binding constraint on job creation. The first order conditions are equations (10) and (11), and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are equations (13) and (14).
Define dividends as D t = X t N t − W t N t − κV t and the ex-dividend equity value as P t = S t − D t .
Expanding S t yields:
Recursively substituting equations (10) and (11) yields: P t + X t N t − W t N t − κV t = X t N t − W t N t + µ t (1 − s)N t . Using equation (10) to simplify further: P t = κV t + µ t (1 − s)N t = µ t [(1 − s)N t + q(θ t )V t ] + λ t q(θ t )V t = µ t N t+1 , in which the last equality follows from equation (14).
To show equation (15), we expand the stock returns: .3) in which the last equality follows because µ t+1 q(θ t+1 )V t+1 − κV t+1 = −λ t+1 q(θ t+1 )V t+1 = 0 from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
B Wage Determination under Nash Bargaining
Let 0 < η < 1 denote the relative bargaining weight of the worker, J N t the marginal value of an employed worker to the representative family, J U t the marginal value of an unemployed worker to the representative family, φ t the marginal utility of the representative family, S N t the marginal value of an employed worker to the representative firm, and S V t the marginal value of an unfilled vacancy to the representative firm. A worker-firm match turns an unemployed worker into an employed worker for the representative household as well as an unfilled vacancy into a filled vacancy (an employed worker) for the firm. As such, we can define the total surplus from the Nash bargain as:
The wage equation (20) is determined via the Nash worker-firm bargain:
2)
The outcome of maximizing equation (B.2) is the surplus-sharing rule: 
B.1 Workers
Let φ t denote the Lagrange multiplier for the household's budget constraint (17). The household's maximization problem is given by:
The first-order condition for consumption yields:
φ t = (1 − β)C − subject to N t+1 = (1 − s)N t + q(θ t )V t . The first-order condition with respect to V t says:
(B.14)
In addition, differentiating S t with respect to N t yields:
Combining the last two equations yields the intertemporal job creation condition in equation (12).
B.3 The Wage Equation
From equations (B.8), (B.11), and (B.15), the total surplus of the worker-firm relationship is: B.16) in which the last equality follows from the definition of Λ t and the surplus sharing rule (B.3).
The surplus sharing rule implies S N t = (1 − η)Λ t , which, combined with equation (B.15), yields:
Combining equations (B.16) and (B.17) yields:
Using equations (B.3) and (B.14) to simplify further: 
Productivity Employment
Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, when V t > 0, then λ t = 0, and equation (B.19) reduces to the wage equation (20) because f (θ t ) = θ t q(θ t ). On the other hand, when the irreversibility constraint is binding, λ t > 0, but V t = 0 means θ t = 0 and f (θ t ) = 0. Equation (B.19) reduces to W t = ηX t + (1 − η)b. Because θ t = 0, the wage equation (20) continues to hold.
C Additional Details of the Nonlinear Solution
We approximate the x t process in equation (5) based on the discrete state space method of Rouwenhorst (1995) with 15 grid points. 7 This grid is large enough to cover the values of x t within four unconditional standard deviations from its unconditional mean of zero. We set the minimum value of N t to be 0.0375 and the maximum value to be 0.99. This range is large enough so that N t never hits one of the boundaries in simulations. We use cubic splines with 40 basis functions on the N space to approximate E(N t , x t ) on each grid point of x t . We use extensively the approximation took kit in the CompEcon Toolbox of Miranda and Fackler (2002) . To obtain an initial guess for the projection algorithm, we use the social planner's solution via value function iteration. (24), defined as E(N t , x t ) − E t M t+1 X t+1 − W t+1 + (1 − s) κ q(θ t+1 ) − λ (N t+1 , x t+1 ) . These errors, in the magnitude no higher than 10 −13 , are extremely small. As such, our nonlinear algorithm does an accurate job in characterizing the competitive equilibrium in the search economy.
